PowerPoint, ArcaneDoor, the Z80 and Kaiser Permanente
Notable security news from the week of April 21st with a small side of nostalgia for the Z80 CPU; we'll dive into the exploitation of an old PowerPoint CVE from 2017, ArcaneDoor and the targeting of Cisco perimiter devices and an enormous breach of Kaiser Permanente user information!GhostStripe, Sec Clearance bill, JR EAST, Vulnrichment, and Solar Storm
This weekKoichi is back as editor for another round-up of the news. This time I chose these security news: GhostStripe, Security Clearance bill, and RISS, Suspected attack on Japan Railway (JR) East, Vulnrichment; and Solar Storm.InSpectre, Rust/PANOS CVEs, X URL blunder and More-April 8-14, 2024-F5 SIRT-This Week in Security
Editor'sIntroduction Hello, Arvin is your editor for This Week in Security. As usual, I collected some interesting security news. Credit to the original articles. Intel processors are affected by a Native Branch History Injection (Native BHI) attack and the tool InSpectre, a tool that can find gadgets (code snippets that can serve as a jumping point to bypass sw and hw protections) in an OS kernel on vulnerable hardware. Spectre style attacks that abuses speculative execution on processors has been around for a while now. Intel updated their previous published article on "Branch History Injection and Intra-mode Branch Target Injection" guidance and included an "Additional Hardening Options" section. The silver lining in this, is the CVEs CVSS score are Medium severity. See the section snippets from the research paper of the researchers from VU Amsterdam that illustrates the use InSpectre tool. Rust has a critical CVE - CVE-2024-24576. It affects the Rust standard library, which was found to be improperly escaping arguments when invoking batch files on Windows using the library's Command API – specifically, std::process::Command. It is specific to the Windows OS cmd exe as it has complex parsing rules and allowed untrusted inputs to be safely passed to spawned processes. Next is a PAN OS Critical CVE, where it affects devices with firewall configurations with GlobalProtect gateway and device telemetry enabled. CVE-2024-3400 affects PAN-OS 10.2, PAN-OS 11.0 and PAN-OS 11, Updates to fully fix this CVE were made available from April 14. Refer tohttps://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2024-3400 Change Healthcare's worries on effects of a previous breach due to ALPHV ransomware group appears to be not over. Per the report, the victim organization was potentially "exit" scammed by ALPHV and is being pursued by the "contactor/affiliate" of the ransomware attack, RansomHub, demanding another round of ransom to be paid, else, they sell the exfiltrated data to the highest bidder. X/Twitter had an URL blunder where it converts anything with the string twitter in their site's tweets and then converts it to the letter X - example, netflitwitter[.]com will be converted to netflix[.]com. This behavior was reversed and back to usual, but X twitter[.]com URLs now properly converts to X[.]com. Lastly, a round up of issues from MS, Fortinet, SAP, Cisco, Adobe, Google/Android. As in previous TWIS editions, some of these news were a recurrence/follow up. In general, keep your systems up to date on software versions, secure access to them and allow only trusted users and applications to run. Implement layers of protections - updated AV/ED/XDR on Server and End User systems, Firewall/network segmentation rules/IPS to prevent further spread/lateral movement in the event of a ransomware attack (BIG-IP AFM have network firewall, IPS features that you can consider), a WAF to protect your web applications and APIs - BIG-IP ASM/Adv WAF, F5 Distributed Cloud Services, NGINX App Protect have security policy configuration and attack signatures that can mitigate known command injection techniques and other web exploitation techniques. End user security training and awareness, incident response and reporting will help an organization should that first phishing email reaches a target end user mailbox. If it feels "off" and looks suspicious, stop and ponder before clicking. I hope this edition of TWIS is educational. You can also read past TWIS editions and othercontent from the F5 SIRT , so check those out as well. Till next time! Rust rustles up fix for 10/10 critical command injection bug on Windows in std lib Programmers are being urged to update their Rust versions after the security experts working on the language addressed a critical vulnerability that could lead to malicious command injections on Windows machines. The vulnerability, which carries a perfect 10-out-of-10 CVSS severity score, is tracked as CVE-2024-24576. It affects the Rust standard library, which was found to be improperly escaping arguments when invoking batch files on Windows using the library's Command API – specifically, std::process::Command. "An attacker able to control the arguments passed to the spawned process could execute arbitrary shell commands by bypassing the escaping," said Pietro Albini of the Rust Security Response Working Group, who wrotethe advisory. The main issue seems to stem from Windows' CMD.exe program, which has more complex parsing rules, and Windows can't execute batch files without it, according to the researcher at Tokyo-based Flatt Security whoreported the issue. Albini said Windows' Command Prompt has its own argument-splitting logic that works differently from the usual Command::arg and Command::args APIs provided by the standard library, which typically allow untrusted inputs to be safely passed to spawned processes. "On Windows, the implementation of this is more complex than other platforms, because the Windows API only provides a single string containing all the arguments to the spawned process, and it's up to the spawned process to split them," said Albini. "Most programs use the standard C run-time argv, which in practice results in a mostly consistent way arguments are split. "Unfortunately it was reported that our escaping logic was not thorough enough, and it was possible to pass malicious arguments that would result in arbitrary shell execution." https://www.theregister.com/2024/04/10/rust_critical_vulnerability_windows/ It's 2024 and Intel silicon is still haunted by data-spilling Spectre Intel CPU cores remain vulnerable to Spectre data-leaking attacks, say academics at VU Amsterdam. We're told mitigations put in place at the software and silicon level by the x86 giant to thwart Spectre-style exploitation of its processors' speculative execution can be bypassed, allowing malware or rogue users on a vulnerable machine to steal sensitive information – such as passwords and keys – out of kernel memory and other areas of RAM that should be off limits. The boffins say they have developed a tool called InSpectre Gadget that can find snippets of code, known as gadgets, within an operating system kernel that on vulnerable hardware can be abused to obtain secret data, even on chips that have Spectre protections baked in. InSpectre Gadget was used, as an example, to find a way to side-step FineIBT, a security feature built into Intel microprocessors intended to limitSpectre-stylespeculative execution exploitation, and successfully pull off a Native Branch History Injection (Native BHI) attack to steal data from protected kernel memory. "We show that our tool can not only uncover new (unconventionally) exploitable gadgets in the Linux kernel, but that those gadgets are sufficient to bypass all deployed Intel mitigations," the VU Amsterdam teamsaidthis week. "As a demonstration, we present the first native Spectre-v2 exploit against the Linux kernel on last-generation Intel CPUs, based on the recent BHI variant and able to leak arbitrary kernel memory at 3.5 kB/sec." https://www.theregister.com/2024/04/10/intel_cpus_native_spectre_attacks/ fromhttps://download.vusec.net/papers/inspectre_sec24.pdf 2.2 Spectre v2 In 2018, the disclosure of Spectre [29] famously demonstratedhow speculation can be used to leak data across security domains. One variant presented in the paper, originally known asSpectre v2 or Branch Target Injection (BTI), shows how speculation of indirect branches can be used to transiently divertthe control flow of a program and redirect it to an attackerchosen location. The attack works by poisoning one of theCPU predictors, the Branch Target Buffer (BTB), which isused to decide where to jump on indirect branch speculation. Initially, mitigations were proposed at the software leveland, later, in-silicon mitigations such as Intel eIBRS [5] anARM CSV2 [12] were added to newer generations of CPUsto isolate predictions across privilege levels. 2.3 Branch History Injection In 2022, Branch History Injection (BHI) [13] showed that,despite mitigations, cross-privilege Spectre v2 is still possibleon latest Intel CPUs by poisoning the Branch History Buffer(BHB). Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the attack. In summary, by executing a sequence of conditionalbranches (HA and HV ) right before performing a system call,an unprivileged attacker can cause the CPU to transientlyjump to a chosen target (TA) when speculating over an indirect call in the kernel (CV ). This happens because the CPUpicks the speculative target forCV from a shared structure, theBTB, that is indexed using both the address of the instructionand the history of previous conditional branches, which isstored in the Branch History Buffer (BHB). Finding the rightcombination of histories that will result in a collision can bedone with brute-forcing.To ensure the injected target, TA, contains a disclosure gadget, the original BHI attack relied on the presence of theextended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF), through which anunprivileged user can craft code that lives in the kernel. Figure 2: InSpectre gadget workflow. The analyst provides akernel image and a list of target addresses to InSpectre Gadget⃝1 , which performs in-depth inspection to find gadgets thatcan leak secrets and output their characteristics. The gadgetscan be filtered ⃝2 based on the available attacker-controlledregisters and the mitigations enabled, and used to craft Spectrev2 exploits against the kernel ⃝3 . Zero-day exploited right now in Palo Alto Networks' GlobalProtect gateways Palo Alto Networks on Friday issued a critical alert for an under-attack vulnerability in the PAN-OS software used in its firewall-slash-VPN products. The command-injection flaw, with an unwelcome top CVSS severity score of 10 out of 10, may let an unauthenticated attacker execute remote code with root privileges on an affected gateway, which to put it mildly is not ideal. It can, essentially, be exploited to take complete control of equipment and drill into victims' networks. Updates to fully fix this severe hole are due to arrive by Sunday, April 14, we're told. CVE-2024-3400affects PAN-OS 10.2, PAN-OS 11.0 and PAN-OS 11.1 firewall configurations with a GlobalProtect gateway and device telemetry enabled. Cloud firewalls, Panorama appliances, and Prisma Access are not affected, Palo Altosays. Zero-day exploitation of this vulnerability was detected on Wednesday by cybersecurity shop Volexity, on a firewall it was monitoring for a client. After an investigation determined that the firewall had been compromised, the firm saw another customer get hit by the same intruder on Thursday. "The threat actor, which Volexity tracks under the alias UTA0218, was able to remotely exploit the firewall device, create a reverse shell, and download further tools onto the device," the networks security management firm said in ablog post. "The attacker focused on exporting configuration data from the devices, and then leveraging it as an entry point to move laterally within the victim organizations." The intrusion, which begins as an attempt to install a custom Python backdoor on the firewall, appears to date back at least to March 26, 2024. Palo Alto Networks refers to the exploitation of this vulnerability as Operation MidnightEclipse, which at least is more evocative than the alphanumeric jumble UTA0218. The firewall maker says while the vulnerability is being actively exploited, only a single individual appears to be doing so at this point. mitigations include applying a GlobalProtect-specificvulnerability protection, if you're subscribed to Palo Alto's Threat Prevention service, or "temporarily disabling device telemetry until the device is upgraded to a fixed PAN-OS version. Once upgraded, device telemetry should be re-enabled on the device." It urged customers to follow the above security advisory and thanked the Volexity researchers for alerting the company and sharing its findings. ® https://www.theregister.com/2024/04/12/palo_alto_pan_flaw/ https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/04/12/zero-day-exploitation-of-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-globalprotect-cve-2024-3400/ https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2024-3400/ Change Healthcare faces second ransomware dilemma weeks after ALPHV attack Change Healthcare is allegedly being extorted by a second ransomware gang, mere weeks after recovering from an ALPHV attack. RansomHub claimed responsibility for attacking Change Healthcare in the last few hours, saying it had 4 TB of the company's data containing personally identifiable information (PII) belonging to active US military personnel and other patients, medical records, payment information, and more. The miscreants are demanding a ransom payment from the healthcare IT business within 12 days or its data will be sold to the highest bidder. "Change Healthcare and United Health you have one chance in protecting your clients data," RansomHub said. "The data has not been leaked anywhere and any decent threat intelligence would confirm that the data has not been shared nor posted. The org is alleged to have paid a $22 million ransom to ALPHV following the incident – a claim made by researchers monitoring a known ALPHV crypto wallet and one backed up by RansomHub. However, Change Healthcare has never officially confirmed this to be the case. If all of the claims are true, it means the embattled healthcare firm is deciding whether to pay a second ransom fee to keep its data safe. the prevailing theory among infosec watchers is that ALPHV pulled what's known as an exit scam after Change allegedly paid its ransom. While the ratios vary slightly between gangs, generally speaking, ransomware payments are split 80/20 – 80 percent for the affiliate that actually carried out the attack and 20 percent for the gang itself. It's believed that ALPHV took 100 percent of the alleged payment from Change Healthcare, leaving the affiliate responsible for the attack without a commission. Angry and searching for what they believed they were "owed," the affiliate is thought to have retained much of the data it stole and now switched allegiances to RansomHub in one last throw of the dice to earn themselves a payday, or so the theory goes. UnitedHealth, parent company of Change Healthcare,discloseda cybersecurity incident on February 22, saying at the time it didn't expect it to materially impact its financial condition or the results of its operations. It originally suspected nation state attackers to be behind the incident, but the ALPHV ransomware gang later claimed responsibility. Many of its systems were taken down as a result while it assessed and worked to remediate the damage. Hospitals and pharmacies reported severe disruption to services following the attack, with many unable to process prescriptions, payments, and medical claims. Cashflow issues also plagued many institutions, prompting the US government tointervene. The IT biz's data protection standards are soon to be subject to aninvestigationby the US healthcare industry's data watchdog, which cited the "unprecedented magnitude of this cyberattack" in its letter to Change. https://www.theregister.com/2024/04/08/change_healthcare_ransomware/ X fixes URL blunder that could enable convincing social media phishing campaigns Elon Musk's X has apparently fixed an embarrassing issue implemented earlier in the week that royally bungled URLs on the social media platform formerly known as Twitter. Users started noticing on Monday that X's programmers implemented a rule on its iOS app that auto-changedTwitter.comlinks that appeared in Xeets toX.com links. Attackers could feasibly copy legitimate web pages to steal credentials, or skip the trouble and simply use it as a malware-dropping tool, or any number of other possibilities. The potential for abuse here would be rife, given the number of legitimate, well-known brands most people would blindly trust. Netflix, Plex, Roblox, Clorox, Xerox – you get the picture. According to tests at Reg towers on Wednesday morning, the issue appears to have been reversed. Netflitwitter[.]com now reads as such, but Twitter.com is auto-changed to X.com.
Maintainers, Slowloris/2, Kobold Letters - April 1st - 7th, 2024 - F5 SIRT - This Week in Security
Introduction Hello again, Kyle Fox here. This week we have some shorter bits about things, in which I promise two more future articles, which I think means I am up to three non-TWIS articles in the pipeline. We have to talk about project maintainers again. We have all seen that one XKCD comic about dependency maintainers. The xz situation has resurfaced a common plea from Open Source maintainers: We need funds and help. I don't have any real deep commentary here, just a plea that companies heavily dependent on Open Source projects should consider giving back to the community by retaining internal SMEs who can help projects resolve issues by submitting bug fixes, contribute to those projects financially, and possibly consider hiring internal people to work on the major features they want out of these projects. Platforms like GitHub may be able to help by moderating discussions to keep project maintainers from being abused by users. And the community should work better at being a positive force for change. And the same goes for conferences, some of us spend lots of time working on all the little details so you can go to DEF CON, have parties to go to, things to hack and places to hack them in. Its easy to look at something like DEF CON and think that its just another industry conference and everyone is being paid to be there, but very few people are paid to be there. I will further discuss this soon in a post about the current DEF CON situation and venues. Is the HTTP/2 CONTINUATION Attack Just Slowloris/2? On April 3rd the industry got wind of a new attack on HTTP/2, this time you could consume resources by sending a steady stream of CONTINUATION frames, leaving the connection open and consuming resources. This came on the tail end of the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack, which consumed resources in an orthogonal way. If this attack sounds familiar, its because it is almost the same attack for HTTP/2 as the Slowloris attack was for HTTP/1.1. You could also compare it to the Slow POST attack as well. How Slowloris worked, for those who may have forgotten since 2009, is the attacker will send a HTTP/1.1 request to a webserver and then slowly send one header at a time, holding the connection open for a very long time with limited traffic. On susceptible webservers they would only need to send headers fast enough to keep the TCP connection from timing out, since the webserver does not have a timeout for the header stage of the request. The Slow POST attack is similar, but slowly sending chunks of POST data rather than headers, relying on the webserver not timing out on those. BIG-IP mitigated Slowloris by its normal behavior of buffering all the headers before forwarding a request to the backend servers. A limit on the number and/or size of headers allows further refinement of this mitigation. When mitigated, these attacks only generate at most an open connection on the backend with no request. This same behavior mitigated the HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack and now mitigates the HTTP/2 CONTINUATION attack. As we can see from this, old attacks can become new ones when a new or significantly revised protocol comes along. This is why when working on new features F5 performs Threat Modelling Assessments to categorize possible new variations of old attacks or completely new attacks that may apply to a new feature, protocol or service and build in protections against those attacks. Display: none Strikes Again, Now in Email. A recent post over at Lutra Security called Kobold Letters has resurfaced an old trick with CSS, but this time in email. The basic TL;DR of this trick is using display: none attached to CSS in an email to hide text in the email until its forwarded or replied to. Email clients often will convert an email to plain text or try to convert the HTML and CSS slightly. This results in the ability to put blocks of text in divs or other selectable blocks that can be styled in CSS to hide them or otherwise change their display and appearance when they are forwarded or replied to. I don't know if this really changes much in the spear-phishing risk area, at this point organizations should have considerable controls in places to make sure that fund transfers are only acted on with clear verified approval and that the destinations of fund transfers are vetted and verified, not copied from some email and sent without checking. Fortunately in this case the vendors have been informed and they are working to provide solutions to this attack, so it may not be viable for very long. Are Bluetooth Discovery Attacks Drying Up? I don't have much to write here since I have not yet dove into the data that much, but the Bluetooth Discovery attacks that I talked about in December appear to not be as popular as they once were. I used Wall-of-Flippers at a few conventions in March to collect Flipper and Bluetooth Discovery Spam data, but it appears that not a whole lot of spamming was happening. Apple and Google Android have been working on mitigating these attacks, Apple having released several iOS updates to patch it. The lack of impact these days may be driving this trend. I do intend on bringing the Wall-of-Flippers to more events, and will be doing a bigger writeup on the device, the software and the data collected here on DevCentral in the coming month or two. Roundup Not a channel this time, but a single video by TwinkleTwinkie: Understanding & Making PCB Art. Google to delete records made from users using Incognito Mode in lawsuit settlement. Microsoft has announced how much it will cost to keep Windows 10 past the date they want you to move to Windows 11. No word on a better Windows 11 UI. Fake AI lawfirms are sending DMCA takedowns to generate SEA gains. (Original report) A recommendation from my recent trip to Las Vegas: Roberto's Taco Shop. Wi-Fi only works when its raining. This is a lesson in sometimes the observations, while absurd, are correct. Roku wants to insert ads in HDMI inputs? DEF CON now has hotel blocks at the Sahara Las Vegas, The Fontainebleau Las Vegas and Resort World.CPU vulns, LoopDOS, AI worms and Bad Bots - March 18th - 24th - This Week in Security
Editor's introduction Aaron back with you as editor this week, and I'm going to look at a few of the interesting pieces of secrurity news from the week just gone - the good news is, there was a lot of interesting news! The bad news is, that interesting news usually means more work for us all... allow me to walk you through a few of the interesting things I saw this week and give you my take on what their real-world impact is going to be to us all. We in F5 SIRT invest a lot of time understanding the frequently changing behavior of bad actors. Bad actors are a threat to your business, your reputation, and your livelihood. That’s why we take the security of your business seriously. When you’re under attack, we’ll work quickly to effectively mitigate attacks and vulnerabilities, and get you back up and running.So next time you are under security emergency please contact F5 SIRT. Processor architecture back in the news First up; processor architecture and vulnerabilities are back in the news again! In the last week we have seen at least three new processor vulnerabilities disclosed - the first two, GhostRace and IPI, both impact all (or most, at least) processor architectures; x86, ARM, RISC-V etc, and deal with exploiting speculative race conditions. In other words, they are a lot like Spectre & Meltdown (there's a great lightboard session if you need a reminder of that research from 2018). GhostRace (CVE-2024-2193) deals with bypassing of synchronization primitives - that is, code designed to prevent multiple threads from trampling on a common resource - like mutexes and spinlocks by using a Spectre-v1 attack on the speculative execution paths. The research was undertaken specifically on Linux although it is quite likely (at least in my opinion) that other operating systems will be similarly affected, but at least on Linux the research showed that the Linux kernel itself is vulnerable to this style of attack. IPI Storming (CVE-2024-26602) is the second half of the complete attack demonstrated in the paper(s); because successful exploitation requires the attacker to win a race condition, exploitation would be most successful if winning that race could be guaranteed. That's where IPI Storming comes in. IPI stands for Inter-Process Interrupt, and the researchers found they could indefinitely 'pause' the victim process by flooding the CPU core it is executing on with interrupts. This allows the attacker to pause the victim process while it is within it's 'race' window (how much of a race is it if the other competitor isn't moving, though) and carry out an infinite number of Speculative Concurrent Use-After-Free attempts. Once successful this attack can leak memory from a target process or, indeed, the Linux kernel at a rate of 12KB/s. As with Spectre, Meltdown and most other hardware-level vulnerabilities that we have seen, the only real mitigation here is to ensure you never run untrusted code on your systems. While there is partial mitigation being added to the Linux kernel for CVE-2024-26602, completely mitigating these issues would reduce processor and operating system performance so significantly as to be improbable. Most (if not all) processor vendors have responded that the mitigations for GhostRace are idenitcal to those for Spectre v1, in fact. That said, the researchers suggest only a 5% performance overhead for their suggested mitigations, albeit in synthetic benchmarks. Despite that assertion I don't believe we'll see widespread adoption of kernel-level or microarchitecture level fixes for this or any other similar vulnerabilities; simply put, we are too addicted to the performance boost speculative execution gives us in modern processors. Just in case Apple were feeling left out with the focus here being on x86 and Linux, we also saw GoFetchpublished last week. This flaw is specific to Apple's M1, M2 and M3 silicon and can allow an attacker access to cryptographic keys, allowing them to access encrypted files or any other data protected by those keys. Once again the research deals with exploiting speculative predictions - in this case we aren't predicting branches in code (as per Spectre) but rather the processor's Data Memory-dependent Prefetcher (DMP) tries to predict which memory address the running code is going to request next so that it can be pre-fected into cache to improve performance. Apparently sometimes, however, the DMP gets the addresses mixed up with thecontents of those addresses, and the attacker can then use cache side channels to guess parts of a cryptograhic key until they've recovered the entire key, and the entire attack can be carried out by unprivileged code running as a regular user. All of the suggested fixes impact performance in some way (did I mention we are addicted to performance, already?) though they have suggested mitigations that might be acceptable to the average user such as pinning cryptographic functions to the "efficiency" cores (which lack DMP functionality) or disable DMP when running security critical applications, leaving it available for performance-focused applications. But, as with the other issues we've talked about today, what manufacturer wants to reduce performance when performance benchmarks are one of the very things they rely on to differentiate themselves from the competition - especially for Apple, who leaned heavily into their roots of media production with the M-silicon and saw huge performance gains (talking to AubreyKingF5 , This Month in Security editor and vidographer extraordinaire, I know that a 4k video which previously took 4 hours to render on his 12 core Intel Macbook now takes 20 minutes thanks to the M-silicon - or, as he put it: "I used to have to set my videos to render overnight. Now, I go get a cup of decaf and it’s done when I’m back."). Would they really want to give any of that up, or push the responsibility back to the user under the guise of "don't run untrusted code"? https://www.vusec.net/projects/ghostrace/ https://www.macworld.com/article/2276399/gofetch-flaw-m1-m2-m3-processor-cryptographic-performance.html Packet goes in, packet goes out, packet goes in, packet goes out.. If you've worked in the networking space for any amount of time, you've probably created a routing or bridging loop at least once in your career, right? Just me? Oh.. I jest, but at least when trying to reproduce parts of complex environments in the lab, it is (in my experience, anyway!) rather easy to accidentally create a loop and have no spanning tree or other mitigations in place and you can quickly take down an entire switching infrastructure - honestly, I have done it more than once although it has, thankfully, been a while. We see them in the F5 SIRT, too; sometimes what presents as a world-ending Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) turns out to actually be a loop between devices or within a single device, and that storm of traffic was simply a device talking back to itself as fast as it possibly could. Well, enter LoopDOS. I'm going to say something perhaps contraversial here; LoopDOS should not come as a surprise to any of us. At it's core, LoopDOS simply states that (I'm paraphrasing) "The UDP protocol lacks any protection against IP spoofing, this allows an attacker to spoof the source IP on malicious traffic directed to Victim A and have the responses sent to Victim B" and this isnot really news. In fact that is the core of many well understood (and well used!) attacks like DNS amplification where a small request from the attacker sends a large response from a target DNS server back to the ultimate victim; what's new in LoopDOS, however, is that the researchers have identified a number of UDP-based services which can be exploited such that a single packet from the attacker will cause Victim A and Victim B to talk to each otherforever,importantly, the vulnerable services included some very common services like DNS and NTP (plus TFTP, though I think it is fair to say that TFTP is less widely exposed to the Internet than DNS and NTP!). They also demonstrated that legacy services such as QOTD, Chargen, Echo, Time, Daytime and Active Users were vulnerable to the same attack and linked to an old advisory from 1996, CA-1996-01 and honestly this is where I start to have a problem.. CA-1996-01 describes exactly what LoopDOS describes - and it described it28 years ago. The advice in CA-1996-01 and LoopDOS is also largely the same - be very careful when you expose UDP services, don't expose legacy UDP services like chargen and echo (also widely documented as amplification vectors already) monitor traffic and implement rate limiting mechanisms to prevent a complete denial-of-service should a loop occur (the LoopDOS authors also recommend migrating to TCP where possible); so AFM's L4DOS protections are your friend, here. I'm not discounting the usefulness or validity of the researcher, but giving it a catchy name and all the press coverage it's received seemstoo much for what is a fundamental part of a protocl which has existed for 40 years, and describing a flaw first described nearly 30 years prior. Still, here I am, adding to the news coverage.. https://cispa.de/en/loop-dos https://vuls.cert.org/confluence/display/historical/CERT+Advisory+CA-1996-01+UDP+Port+Denial-of-Service+Attack AI worms No, not the ones in the video game, but the kind that infiltrate computer systems and do damage or steal data. Let's talk about ComPromptMized! My first thought was that this was another piece of research on using generative AI to create malware but no - in fact, this is malware that targets generative AI powered applications like email assistants to coerce those assistance into taking malicious action like sending spam or exfiltrating the legitimate user's data. This is far more intriguing to me than the news we've seen in past months about GenAI writing polymorphic malware; this is bascially automated AI prompt-engineering which could be done at-scale to quietly subvert existing infrastructure (such as email) to very quietly exfiltrate data. That's much harder to detect than a new piece of malware trampling across systems (IMHO) as the exfil channel is legitimate, expected, activity. Once again the only mitigation I can really think of is tightly controlling what software is allowed to run on endpoint devices - ensure users can't download arbitrary executables, white-list only known approved software and so on (of course, antivirus/antimalware/etc tooling has a role to play, but that is shown to be routinely bypassed). As a user, I don't really want to see draconian lockdowns on devices but, as a security professional, I can feel it coming.. https://sites.google.com/view/compromptmized More Bad Bots While we are on the topic of malware, I'd like to reference an article that is from slightly outside of "my week" and point everyone to F5 Labs' 2024 Bad Bots Review published March 14th. This is a great drill down into the kinds and amounts of bot traffic mobile APIs and web applications are seeing in the real world, trends across industry verticals (healthcare and hospitality being the leaders in the charts for web traffic, while entertainment leads the way for mobile APIs) as well as across functionality (e.g., search & giftcards are most often automated). It's a 15 minute read and, in my opinion, well worth giving the time to! Of course if (and when) you find yourself on the receiving end of bot traffic, as most sites will at some point, F5 Distributed Cloud Bot Defense can help, as can the F5 SIRTs Emergency Security Response Process if you would rather mitigate using on premise solutions! https://www.f5.com/labs/articles/threat-intelligence/2024-bad-bots-review
